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THE NEW DEFERENCE-BASED APPROACH TO
ADJUDICATING POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN
CORPORATE ATS CASES: POTENTIAL
PITFALLS AND WORKABLE FIXES
Seth Korman*
Much has been made of executive-branch attempts to exert control over cases brought against corporations under the Alien Tort Statute. Under the Bush Administration, the executive branch repeatedly
sought to influence district court opinions through targeted letters to
the court or statements of interest. These letters, frequently written by
the State Department legal advisor, sought to convince courts that adjudication of claims against corporate defendants would have an adverse effect on U.S. foreign policy, thus triggering the political question
doctrine and forcing the courts to rule the claims nonjusticiable.
Though some courts have, in fact, deferred entirely to the executive
branch, others have stood firm. In the process, and through a creative
streamlining of the Baker v. Carr political question doctrine analysis,
courts have inadvertently created a new two-prong method of analyzing
political questions in corporate ATS cases. While this new analysis
simplifies adjudicating these cases, and has so far allowed courts to
resist executive branch intrusion, it leaves open such a possibility.
This article first demonstrates how, through this new analysis,
courts have stumbled upon a way to reasonably assess executive claims
of foreign-policy infringement while at the same time maintaining some
level of deference to the executive branch’s judgment. Through an analysis of State Department letters and the courts’ respective responses, it
reveals a shift in the Baker analysis away from the classic six-factor
test towards a more streamlined, two-prong up-or-down assessment.
This new approach both simplifies political question doctrine adjudication and prevents the executive branch from unilaterally curtailing
claims of human rights violations against large corporate defendants.
Second, this article argues that this approach does not conclusively address remaining separation of powers concerns, and thus
needs to go further. A strengthened up-or-down approach that actually
probes the merits of executive branch argumentation would prevent the
executive from subverting—through either the old status quo reliance
* Editor-in-Chief, UCLA Law Review. B.A., M.A., J.D. (2010). I thank Jack
Beard for his help with this article, as well as Sam Ennis, Eric Lindberg, and Julia
Shear Kushner for their general assistance and encouragement.
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on Baker or a weak up-or-down approach—a powerful judicial branch
tool for holding responsible corporate human rights violators.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE, THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
POWERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. The Alien Tort Statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Political Question Doctrine and United States
Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. The Relationship Between the ATS and Political
Question Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE JUDICIARY AND
THE EXECUTIVE IN CORPORATE ATS CASES . . . . . . .
A. Targeted Letters and Statements of Interest . . . . . . . . . .
B. How do Courts Treat Executive Statements in ATS
Cases? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. THE IMPACT OF EXECUTIVE STATEMENTS IN
NINE MAJOR ATS CASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Method of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. The Major Recent ATS Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW, DEFERENCE-BASED
ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. The Limits of Political Questions in ATS Cases . . . . . .
B. Courts Have Abandoned Baker in Corporate ATS
Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. A New Two-Step, Deference-Based Approach . . . . . . . . .
V. THE NEXT STEP: WHY COURTS MUST HOLD THE
LINE, AND HOW THEY CAN DO SO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Separation of Powers Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Preventing Executive Branch Aggrandizement . . .
2. Only the Judiciary can Adjudicate Matters of
Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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“For the reasons detailed below, the Department of State
believes that adjudication of this lawsuit at this time
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would in fact risk a potentially serious adverse impact on
significant interests of the United States. . .”1
“For reasons stated below, and in light of the views communicated to us by the Colombian government, the State
Department believes that the adjudication of this case
will have an adverse impact on the foreign policy interests of the United States.”2
“In our judgment, continued adjudication of the claims
. . . would risk a potentially serious adverse impact on
the peace process, and hence on the conduct of our foreign relations.”3
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the executive branch, particularly under
the George W. Bush Administration, has discovered a loophole
through which to insert itself and its opinions into the judicial proceedings in Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) cases.4 As expected and in accordance with that administration’s disdain for the statute,5 the
executive branch has, in most cases, taken the side of defendant corporations. Through targeted backdoor letters or “statements of interest,”
the executive has advocated for dismissal on grounds that adjudication
will threaten U.S. foreign policy interests.6 The three introductory
quotes above are merely a few among many such arguments. Unique
1

Letter from William H. Taft, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, to Judge
Louis F. Oberdorfer, District Court for the District of Columbia, July 29, 2002
[hereinafter Exxon Statement of Interest], available at http://www.cja.org/legalResources/StateDepartmentBriefs/DOSexxon.pdf.
2
Letter from William H. Taft, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, to Daniel
Meron, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice,
Dec. 23, 2004 [hereinafter Mujica Statement of Interest], available at http://www.
state.gov/s/l/2004/78089.htm.
3
Letter from William H. Taft, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, to Robert
D. McCallum, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Oct.
31, 2001 [hereinafter Sarei Statement of Interest], available at http://www.state.
gov/documents/organization/16529.pdf.
4
The statute, also known as the Alien Tort Claims Act, was part of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, and is codified at 28 U.S.C. §1350 (2009). It reads, “[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”
5
See, e.g,. Richard Hermer & Martyn Day, Helping Bush Bushwack Justice,
GUARDIAN, Apr. 27, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/apr/
27/usa.humanrights (looking at the Bush Administration’s attempts to gut the
Alien Tort Claims Act).
6
See supra notes 1–3.
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too is that although the government’s opinion is often solicited by the
courts, the executive branch (and the executive branch alone) is essentially requested to add its persuasive authority at the district court
level.7 While the executive branch, along with any other nonparties,
may file an amicus brief8 (though non-executive amici almost never do
so at the district court level), rarely in district court jurisprudence does
the executive branch weigh in at such an early stage in litigation.
Courts make this exception because these ATS cases often trigger the political question doctrine—that contentious matter of jurisdiction by which a court can essentially deprive itself of its own power of
judicial review. Because foreign-affairs powers are constitutionally
granted primarily to the executive9 and to a lesser extent the legislative branch,10 courts are understandably cautious in making rulings
that may be perceived as foreign policy decision making. However, as
executive intrusion and the use of statements of interest become more
commonplace, and as courts either defer to the executive branch or
incorporate executive foreign-policy concerns into their legal formulations, such intrusion complicates political question doctrine
adjudication.
This is dangerous. While such deference may no longer affect
perceptions of the courts’ relevancy or undermine legitimacy,11 it does
begin to establish a sine qua non situation in which adjudication on
issues touching foreign policy concerns requires executive input, no
matter the courts’ constitutional prerogatives. Yet in ATS cases where
the defendants invoke the political question doctrine, such deference
now seems mandatory. Even if the court does not completely defer to
the executive branch considerations, it still heavily factors such considerations into its decision making.12
The political question doctrine, particularly as it pertains to
foreign affairs, is somewhat of a paradox. Courts cannot rule on a
matter if such a decision is best suited for the executive branch, yet at
the same time, courts frequently do not have the information or wherewithal—without seeking the executive’s opinion—to make an objective
judgment on whether a particular foreign affairs concern is in fact best
7

Id.
See FED. R. APP. P. 29(a).
9
See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
10
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. However, the executive maintains control of the
state’s general foreign policy.
11
See Michael J. Glennon, The United States Constitution in its Third Century:
Foreign Affairs: Distribution of Constitutional Authority: Foreign Affairs and the
Political Question Doctrine, 83 A.J.I.L 814, 816 (1989).
12
See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1206 (C.D. Cal. 2002) rev’d in
part, Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007); Mujica v. Occidental
Petroleum, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1194 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
8
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left to the executive. Put plainly, in certain cases, the court must try
to determine if the executive branch has plenary jurisdiction over an
issue by means other than simply asking it, even though only the executive really has the power to decide whether such an issue is in fact a
political question.
Because the relevant issues of foreign policy tend to fall within
the executive branch, courts cannot know whether a matter is of foreign policy concern without consulting the State Department or White
House, yet deference to the executive’s opinion defeats the purpose of
judicial review entirely. It is thus quite clear why these cases do not
arise with frequency, and why no bright line rule governing the adjudication of foreign affairs political question doctrine issues has been
established.
Instead, as can be seen in different courts’ adjudication of ATS
political question doctrine cases, and as will be demonstrated in this
article,13 courts have taken a more streamlined approach. While they
have nominally followed the political-question factor analysis devised
in Baker v. Carr,14 the results of many of the most recent corporate
ATS cases reveal a striking pattern, and indicate a near abandonment
of Baker in favor of a reserved deference to the executive branch. Despite this deference, however, the courts have so far managed to retain
their authority, standing firm in the face of executive-branch attempts
to undermine the over 200-year-old Alien Tort Statute15 through the
use of the political question doctrine. Yet this judicial bulwark may
not last.
This article seeks to demonstrate that recent ATS political
question doctrine jurisprudence, despite an apparent adherence to the
Baker six-factor analysis, in fact reveals a near-abandonment of Baker.
Instead, courts have adopted a more streamlined approach where the
opinions of and deference to executive concerns have become the most
important factors under consideration. While these cases do not portend an end to the Baker analysis, they do indicate that courts are
making an educated up-or-down decision on whether the political
question applies, and not, as others have argued,16 simply deferring to
the executive branch. Yet this is still dangerous. By simplifying their
method of adjudication, courts are leaving open a path for future exec-

13

See infra Parts III–IV.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
15
28 U.S.C. §1350 (2009).
16
See, e.g., Developments in the Law: Access to the Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151,
1200 (2009); Derek Baxter, Protecting the Power Of The Judiciary: Why the Use of
State Department “Statements Of Interest” in Alien Tort Statute Litigation Runs
Afoul of Separation of Powers Concerns, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 807, passim (2006).
14
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utive argumentation that under this new approach may require courts
to defer unquestioningly to the executive.
This article proceeds in five parts. Part I discusses the ATS
and the political question doctrine as they pertain to the executive
branch’s foreign affairs powers. Part II looks at the actual interplay
between the executive branch and the courts in corporate ATS cases,
and discusses the use of State Department letters and statements of
interest. Part III briefly deconstructs nine important recent ATS cases
where, with one exception, statements of interests were analyzed by
courts and relied on in their decision making.17 Part IV then analyzes
the courts’ reasoning in these cases, and demonstrates the emergence
of an outcome pattern derived not from a Baker analysis, but instead
from an ad hoc reaction to an assessment of the executive branch’s
submitted letter or statement of interest. Finally, Part V argues that
despite courts’ refusal to accede to executive branch concerns, this new
approach still raises separation of powers concerns and remains untenable unless courts receive adequate means to assess the executive
branch argumentation; it then offers generally a potential fix through
which courts could better assess executive opinions and avoid uncritically deferring to the executive branch.
I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE, THE POLITICAL QUESTION
DOCTRINE, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS
Histories of both the ATS and the political question doctrine
have been discussed with some frequency.18 This article briefly reviews the relatively short histories of both with an emphasis on their
nexus as it pertains to ATS cases. What is most important, and what
warrants discussion, is how the statute and the doctrine came to collide, and why they are now viewed by many, notably members of the
second Bush administration, to conflict with one another.
17

This Part is further expanded upon in the Appendix, which looks at these nine
cases in much greater detail.
18
See generally Richard L. Hertz, The Liberalizing Effects of Tort: How Corporate
Complicity Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 211–13 (2008) (providing a more detailed history
of the ATS); Pamela J. Stephens, Spinning Sosa: Federal Common Law, the Alien
Tort Statute, and Judicial Restraint, 25 B.U. INT’L. L.J. 1, 3–7 (2007); Margarita S.
Clarens, Note, Deference, Human Rights And The Federal Courts: The Role Of The
Executive In Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 415,
417–23 (2007). Corrie v. Caterpillar, 503 F.3d 974, 979–82 (9th Cir. 2007) provides an explanation of the history and applicability of the political question doctrine in the foreign policy context. See also Glennon, supra note 11; Lisa R. Price,
Note, Banishing the Specter of Judicial Foreign Policymaking: A CompetenceBased Approach to the Political Question Doctrine, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL.
323, 333–44 (2006).
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Though there has been much written about both, each remains
murky in its own way: the lack of ATS case law precludes the creation
of a specific set of standards to assess justiciability, while the inherent
vagueness19 of the Baker test does not always produce expected outcomes.20 As such, the combination of the two has presented the opportunity for the courts to shape such jurisprudence; fortunately, and to
the Bush administration’s chagrin, the Court failed to comply in Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, refusing to outlaw the ability of foreigners to sue
in U.S. courts.21 The executive, unhappy with the decision in Sosa,
has thus tried to use the political question doctrine to do what it could
not accomplish in Sosa. At some point, a political question doctrine
case that deals with foreign policy deference will likely percolate to the
Supreme Court. Hopefully, and as will be discussed in Part II, the
Court will not veer from the direction currently taken by courts, and,
as in Sosa, will continue to prevent the executive from subverting
what many see as the powerful and symbolic ATS.22
A. The Alien Tort Statute
The Alien Tort Statute, also known as the Alien Tort Claims
Act (“ATCA”), has been simultaneously called a “nightmare”23 as well
as one of “the most progressive and pro-human rights law[s] on the
American statute books. . . .”24 Of course, it has only taken on this
love-hate role since 1980, when the Second Circuit in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala reinvigorated (or reminded human-rights proponents of)
the ATS and its potentially wide jurisdictional reach,25 especially as
the “laws of nations” have grown to encompass such jus cogens as
19
See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine:
Reviving the Federalist “Rebuttable Presumption” Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1165,
1165 (2002).
20
Id. at 1167.
21
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
22
Many scholars have noted the human-rights and general symbolic significance
of the ATS. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff’s Diplomacy,
2000 FOREIGN AFFAIRS Sep./Oct. (2000); Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J. INT’L. L. 461, 493
(1989) (“The larger significance of the Statute today is a window on the past. It
recalls an era in which national policymakers, charged with leadership of a
younger and much more vulnerable nation, nevertheless factored ‘honor’ and ‘virtue’ into their calculus of the national interest.”).
23
GARY C. HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 1 (2003).
24
Hermer & Day, supra note 5.
25
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886–87 (1980).
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prohibitions on torture and genocide.26 As plaintiffs around the world
soon realized, U.S. courts now offered a forum to resolve their often
quite real grievances; all they needed was an action “for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations.”27
Since 1980, over one hundred ATS claims have been filed in
federal courts against a variety of misfeasors, including foreign governments,28 strongmen,29 and multinational corporations.30 It is this
last category that has proven the most interesting. As the Supreme
Court in Sosa did not foreclose the ability to sue private actors in tort
for violations of international law, the ATS has, in the past five years,
become a legal mechanism for plaintiffs seeking compensation in U.S.
courts for corporate human rights violations.31
Unlike foreign governments or officials that can claim sovereign immunity32 or rely on the act of state doctrine for immunity from
ATS suits, corporate defendants lack an obvious jurisdictional loophole
to escape ATS jurisdiction. And unlike unsympathetic war criminals,
these corporate defendants are frequently influential and generally
contribute to the global and political economy. Consequently, these
corporate cases raise the thorniest issues.
On one hand, the defendant corporations are often large conglomerates that are economically and diplomatically important to both
the United States and the foreign countries in which they operate. On
the other, they likely have committed (or aided in and abetted the commission of) torts in violation of international law. As a result, and as
will be seen in the cases to be discussed,33 the U.S. government must
choose sides and support either the large multinational corporation or
26

See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, available at www.un.org/documents/
resga.htm hyperlink (follow “1948” hyperlink and scroll to “260(III)” hyperlink)
(last visited Oct. 2, 2009); Princz v. Germany, 307 U.S. App. D.C. 102, 109 (1994)
(“According to one authority, a state violates jus cogens, as currently defined, if it:
‘practices, encourages, or condones (a) genocide, (b) slavery or slave trade, (c) the
murder or causing the disappearance of individuals, (d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, (e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or (g) a consistent pattern of gross violations
of internationally recognized human rights.’ ”).
27
Filartiga, 630 F.3d at 887.
28
See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
29
See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
30
See, e.g., Doe v. Unocal, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
31
See, e.g., Note, Organizational Irrationality and Corporate Human Rights Violations, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (2009).
32
See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–11 (2006) (“[F]oreign
state[s] shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States.”).
33
See infra Part III.
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the individual victims of gross human rights violations. Under the second Bush administration, during which the vast majority of notable
corporate ATS cases were heard, the executive branch almost always
sided with the former.34
In the typical corporate ATS case, an alien or group of aliens
brings suit in U.S. Federal Court against a defendant corporation for
either direct or complicit liability in any number of human rights violations, such as torture, murder, or even genocide. In Sarei v. Rio
Tinto, PLC35 and Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum,36 for example, the
defendant British/Australian and American corporations were alleged
to have participated with the governments of Papua New Guinea and
Colombia, respectively, in military actions aimed at protecting the corporate facilities and in which innocent civilians were harmed or
killed.37 Since foreign governments can escape judicial liability
through the principle of sovereign immunity, the corporations remained the only potential (deep-pocketed) defendant. What is interesting about the adjudication of these cases, however, is that the
merits of the alleged tortuous conduct and violations of international
law are rarely at issue. Instead, because the defendant corporations
want to avoid judgment on the merits, they seek dismissal through
other means. Since Sosa found the ATS to be merely a jurisdictional
statute,38 defendants can escape liability if they can prove a court
lacks proper jurisdiction over them. Enter then the political question
doctrine.
B. The Political Question Doctrine and United States Foreign Policy
Like the Alien Tort Statute, the political question doctrine is a
product of the Founding era. From the early nineteenth century,
courts understood that some executive branch actions were nonjusticiable. Justice Marshall addressed the issue in Marbury v. Madison39:
By the constitution of the United States, the President is
invested with certain important political powers, in the
34
See, e.g., Richard Herz, Text of Remarks: Corporate Alien Tort Liability and the
Legacy of Nuremberg, 10 GONZ. J. INT’L L. (2006) (“[T]he Bush Administration has
vigorously opposed the use of complicity liability in Alien Tort Statute litigation.
Actually, they vigorously opposed any use of the Alien Tort Statute whatsoever.
They lost that issue before the Supreme Court two years ago in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain. Now, they are attempting to do retail what they were unable to do
wholesale, by attacking various aspects of the Alien Tort Statute . . . .”).
35
221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
36
381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
37
See Sarei, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 1121–27.
38
See Sosa v. Alverez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713–14 (2004).
39
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is
accountable only to his country in his political character,
and to his own conscience. . . . In such cases, [these] acts
are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of
the manner in which executive discretion may be used,
still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that
discretion. The subjects are political.
....
But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it
seems equally clear that the individual who considers
himself injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his
country for a remedy.40
While the opinion failed to clarify the limits of political subjects, it did
establish the existence of a line beyond which judicial authority and
judicial review could not intrude. Over the next century and a half,
the issue arose mostly in domestic matters, though it was used to limit
the judiciary’s oversight of American westward expansion during the
nineteenth century.41 For the most part, however, the doctrine was
rarely invoked.
The Supreme Court revived the near-dormant doctrine in
Baker v. Carr,42 in which it sought to address the confusion and inherent ambiguity of what constitutes a political question. The Baker
Court, in a decision written by Justice Brennan, created the now-famous six-factor test to be used in discerning whether a matter should
remain solely with the political branches’ domain. Under the test, a
matter is nonjusticiable if it demonstrates:
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s
undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the
40

Id. at 165–66.
See Nada Mourtada-Sabbah & John W. Fox, Two Centuries of Changing Political Questions in Cultural Context, in THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 91 (Nada Mourtada-Sabbah & Bruce E.
Cain, eds. 2007).
42
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
41
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potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.43
This factor-driven analysis was not just an attempt to add clarity to an
inherently vague doctrine; more importantly, and some would argue,
dangerously,44 it made the doctrine more accessible to federal courts,
which in turn may have diminished the power of the judicial branch
with every case found to be nonjusticiable.45 This is of some worry,
since “lower courts have found issues to be political and nonjusticiable
more often [in the years] since Baker than in all of our previous
history.”46
Baker and subsequent cases generally used the political question doctrine as it applied to domestic issues, such as voting or redistricting,47 and left little in the way of guidance for courts addressing
the doctrine as it related to foreign policymaking. In fact, Baker’s only
contribution was a note in dicta stating that, “it is error to suppose
that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”48 Though the Supreme Court briefly
touched on the political question doctrine as it pertained to foreign affairs in Goldwater v. Carter49—in which the court found judicial review inapplicable in a particular contest between the executive and
legislative branches—, it has been left to lower courts to sort out the
limits of justiciability in foreign affairs cases. Because of this lack of
guidance, one commentator noted, “Foreign affairs is where the doctrine flourishes and where confusion about it is rampant.”50
The principal question that lower courts have been tasked to
answer is what constitutes a foreign policy decision. In some cases,
the answer is quite obvious. In Bancoult v. McNamara, the D.C. Cir43

Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (paraphrasing Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962)).
44
See Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54
DUKE L.J. 1457, 1477 (2005) (“The Court has never determined . . . whether the
political question doctrine is rooted in the Constitution or is simply a judicial construct that exists at the sufferance of the political branches.”).
45
Choper notes, “if the Court concludes that the resolution of certain constitutional questions would be inconsistent with proper performance of its essential
role in our system of government, then it should invalidate efforts by the political
branches to require it to do so.” Id. at 1478. In other words, excessive political
question rulings foreclose more than the adjudication of particular matters, but
aggrandize the executive and legislative branches at the judiciary’s expense.
46
LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 82
(1990).
47
See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
48
Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
49
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998–99 (1979).
50
HENKIN, supra note 46, at 82.
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cuit, in affirming a decision of nonjusticiability in a suit against the
U.S. government relating to the deportation of aliens during the construction of a military base, found that “[t]he instant case involves topics that serve as the quintessential sources of political questions:
national security and foreign relations. ‘Matters intimately related to
foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.’”51 Similarly, in Schneider v. Kissinger, the court
found that U.S. support for the Pinochet regime was also a nonjusticiable concern, and that nearly all six Baker factors applied to an executive policy decision to support a foreign regime.52 Notably, in both
cases the U.S. government—or actually its officials acting in official
capacity—was the defendant, and as such, the country’s policy decisions were indelibly linked to the named parties on trial.
In many ATS cases, however, the defendant is a third-party
corporation whose actions are not immediately subject-matter excusable—hence the propensity to invoke a justiciability defense.53 The political question doctrine thus provides an apparent path to dismissal.
C. The Relationship Between the ATS and Political Question
Doctrine
Before moving on to a discussion of the actual methods by
which the executive branch tries to influence the judiciary and the
courts’ subsequent responses, it is necessary to look briefly at the relationships between the ATS and the political question doctrine. While
the doctrine is not limited to this line of cases, its reemergence in the
past decades has interestingly tracked that of the ATS. Moreover, in
recent corporate ATS cases, the political question doctrine is consistently asserted as a jurisdictional defense, though until now with little
success.
It is well established that the political question doctrine does
not on its face require courts to dismiss ATS claims brought against
corporations operating in politically sensitive areas.54 In Doe v. Exxon
Mobil Corp., the D.C. Circuit, while avoiding ruling on the merits of
51

Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427, 433 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Haig v.
Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981)).
52
Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251, 258–64 (D.D.C. 2004).
53
See, e.g. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1202 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding
that “Plaintiffs here have alleged several claims asserting jus cogens violations
that form the least controversial core of modern day ATCA jurisdiction, including
allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and racial discrimination,”
and that “Plaintiffs claims are thus not frivolous”). In the cases discussed herein,
the issue is rarely over whether the alleged tortuous conduct is in fact tortuous—
rather, justiciability dismissal is sought so that that the cases do not have to be
litigated on their merits.
54
See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345, 354–55 (D.D.C. 2007).
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the case, chose not to dismiss charges of human rights violations
against Exxon Mobil, despite executive branch support for such a dismissal.55 Other courts have held similarly, finding that a mere suggestion by the executive branch, usually in the form of State
Department letter, that ATS litigation may interfere with U.S. foreign
policy is not on its own sufficient to dismiss the case.56 At the same
time, courts never dismiss such executive statements out of hand, in
part because they have no other means of obtaining information on the
case’s foreign-policy significance.
The Supreme Court has never directly weighed in on this issue;
in fact it has only alluded to it once, in a footnote in Sosa noting that
“there is a strong argument that federal courts should give serious
weight to the Executive Branch’s view of the case’s impact on foreign
policy.”57 Such dicta is merely persuasive, and courts today continue
to follow Kadic v. Karadzic, in which the court held that “even an assertion of the political question doctrine by the Executive Branch, entitled to respectful consideration, [does] not necessarily preclude
adjudication.”58 As a result, courts in ATS cases have ruled both ways,
sometimes deferring to executive branch requests, and sometimes ignoring them. As will be discussed in Part IV, however, the decision to
defer to or ignore the executive branch—or to rule on the existence of a
political question—has become less a decision made through a Baker
analysis, but rather an assessment of the government’s argument delivered in its statement to the court.
II. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE JUDICIARY AND THE
EXECUTIVE IN CORPORATE ATS CASES
Though Filartiga reestablished in 1980 the ability to bring suit
against foreigners in U.S. courts, the first ATS case against a corporate malfeasant was not brought until 1993. Although that case,
Aguinda v. Texaco, was eventually dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds and transferred to Ecuador, it ushered in a new era in which
gross corporate misconduct overseas might be found to be a justiciable
cause of action.59 Though Sosa later limited the causes of actions to
only the most grave violations of international law,60 it reaffirmed the
55

Id. at 356.
See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 2005 WL 2082846, *3–7 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
57
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
58
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 250 (2d Cir. 1995).
59
See Aquinda v. Texaco, 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
60
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 (holding that relevant international norms must be
“of international character accepted by the civilized world”).
56
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Court’s support for this class of litigation, angering both large multinationals and the countries in which they operate.
Naturally, the executive branch was not happy. Because the
executive is tasked with managing the affairs of State, such lawsuits
prompt other nations to express their concerns to the executive
branch, which, in turn, seeks to limit the diplomatic fallout. While the
State Department makes a sincere showing of its general support for
human rights, it has, particularly under the second Bush administration, frequently qualified that support by advocating dismissal of these
suits. Its usual argument is that these suits affect U.S. foreign relations, interfere with the executive’s constitution foreign affairs powers,
trigger the political question doctrine, and must be dismissed.61
Courts, understandably, have remained cautious.
A. Targeted Letters and Statements of Interest
The Ninth Circuit best summarized the importance of statements of interest in their Sarei decision: “We first observe that without
the SOI [Statement of Interest], there would be little reason to dismiss
this case on political question grounds, and therefore that the SOI
must carry the primary burden of establishing a political question.”62
Herein then lies the courts’ major dilemma.
The typical corporate ATS case unfolds as follows: The defendant corporation seeks to dismiss on a number of jurisdictional
grounds, such as the act of state doctrine, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and political question doctrine.63 In its attempt to analyze
the political question defense, the court frequently turns to the executive branch, usually the State Department, to assess the foreign policy
implications of the litigation, as the court on its own cannot necessarily make such a determination.64 The State Department then sends
its opinion directly to the court, either in the form of a letter or a
longer statement of interest, and the court rules on the applicability of
the political question doctrine.65
While different branches of the U.S. government have frequently participated in the judicial process by filing amicus briefs, only
recently have courts begun to make targeted backdoor inquiries to the
executive branch through requested briefs or shorter statements of in61

See infra Part III and Appendix.
Sarei v. RioTinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007).
63
See, e.g. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 979 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Caterpillar moved to dismiss the action. . . under the act of state and political question
doctrines.”); Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 681 (2004) (addressing the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act).
64
See, e.g., Matar v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
65
See infra Part III.
62
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terest.66 The second Bush administration generally took advantage of
this influential power to a greater degree than previous administrations.67 This was particularly true in Alien Tort Statute cases.68
Under 28 U.S.C. § 517, officers of the Department of Justice, on
their own or on behalf of other federal agencies, may attend to the interests of the U.S. government in any federal or state court.69 The
Supreme Court has affirmed the value of such submissions and extended the privilege to other federal agencies, noting that “should the
State Department choose to express its opinion on the implications of
exercising jurisdiction over particular petitioners in connection with
their alleged conduct, that opinion might well be entitled to deference
as the considered judgment of the Executive on a particular question
of foreign policy.”70 In ATS cases, this generally takes on the form of a
letter or statement of interest.71 The letter from State Department
Legal Advisor William H. Taft in Doe v. Exxon provides a good example of the executive response to the court’s request:
This is in response to your letter . . . , in which you invite
the views of the Department of State in connection with
the above-captioned proceedings. Specifically, you inquire “whether the Department of State has an opinion
(non-binding) as to whether adjudication of the case at
this time would impact adversely on interests of the
United States, and, if so, the nature and significance of
that impact.” As you requested, this letter specifically
addresses the potential adverse impacts of the litigation
on U.S. interests. It does not address the legal issues
before the court.
For the reasons detailed below, the Department of State
believes that adjudication of this lawsuit at this time
would in fact risk a potentially serious adverse impact on
significant interests of the United States . . . .72
By making every attempt to steer clear of legal analysis, the letter continues on to describe the specific and more general reasons why adju66

Baxter, supra note 16, at 812–14.
Id at 814.
68
See, e.g. Hermer & Day, supra note 5 (analyzing the Bush Administration’s attempts to gut the Alien Tort Claims Act).
69
28 U.S.C. § 517 (2006) (“[A]ny officer of the Department of Justice . . . may be
sent by the Attorney General to any State or district in the United States to attend
to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court . . . ”).
70
Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004).
71
See, e.g. Baxter, supra note 16, at 811.
72
Exxon Statement of Interest, supra note 1, at 1.
67
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dication might be detrimental to American interests overseas.73 Such
distinction is crucial. While the executive branch (or any third party)
can submit an amicus brief and include legal arguments, these letters
or statements of interests touch on only the factual relevance of the
case as determined by the executive branch. This presents the court
with an additional problem: How best should it assess the veracity of
the government’s claim? Because the political branches by nature
must listen to their constituents74—and because the executive must
listen to its peer executives in other countries—there exists the inclination for the executive to bend the facts to suit it own policy and political decisions. While courts have not said this explicitly, their decision
making on political-question justiciability must take this into consideration, because only the executive knows its own foreign policy (and is
in the best position to assess foreign policy implications). Though
some courts have decided to take professed foreign policy implications
at face value,75 others, particularly the circuit courts, have taken a
firmer stand, noting that, “[u]ltimately, it is our responsibility to determine whether a political question is present, rather than to dismiss
on that ground simply because the Executive Branch expresses some
hesitancy about a case proceeding.”76
B. How do Courts Treat Executive Statements in ATS Cases?
Corporate ATS cases remain at the forefront of an ongoing separation of powers battle between the executive and the judiciary, a dispute exacerbated during the eight years of the Bush Administration.77
One commentator labels these cases a “‘perfect storm’ of converging
interests.”78 He continues, “[t]he statements of interest play into several concerns of the [executive]: curtailing the ATS as a policy matter;
expanding executive power; and, above all, protecting corporations
from what the Administration views as unwarranted costs and litiga73

Id. at 2–3.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Who Should be the Authoritative Interpreter of the
Constitution? Why There Should Not be a Political Question Doctrine, in THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 188
(Nada Mourtada-Sabbah & Bruce E. Cain, eds. 2007) (noting that the “legislature
and executive” are “less likely to uphold the Constitution when faced with intense
reaction from their constituents”).
75
See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002), rev’d in
part, Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006); In re Nazi Era Cases
Against German Defendants Litig.,129 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D. N.J. 2001); BurgerFischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248, 283 (D. N.J. 1999).
76
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007).
77
Baxter, supra note 16, at 811.
78
Id. at 812.
74
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tion risks.”79 Yet because the executive is not asked to present its own
legal analysis, and because it will not waste the court’s time by using
its statements of interest to make policy arguments, the executive is
limited to speculating on the factual implications of the ATS case at
hand.
As such, the executive, through a State Department letter or
statement of interest, may invoke one or more of the following claims:
• The present litigation could/will make it more difficult for
U.S. firms to do business abroad, both in a particular country and in general.80
• An alternative remedy or adjudication process has already
been established.81
• The present litigation would damage U.S. relations with
other countries.82
• Adjudication would interfere with the war on terrorism.83
• Adjudication would interfere with U.S. counter-narcotics
efforts.84
• The litigation could impact the Executive’s ability to manage
a foreign peace process.85
Yet because of the court’s limited fact-finding capabilities—and because the executive is in the best position to know what the potential
foreign policy implications will be—the court, to some extent, has to
take the State Department’s word. What the court does not have to do,
and what it has proven it will not do, however, is accept speculation.
As summarized by the D.C. District Court in Beaty v. Republic of Iraq:
“[T]he deference due a statement filed by the Executive Branch does
hinge in large part on the thoroughness of the statement and of the
representations made therein, including whether the Executive supports dismissal of the suit and on what grounds.”86 As the cases in
79

Id.
See, e.g., In re South African Apartheid Litig., F. Supp. 2d 228, 276–77
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); Exxon Mobil, 473 F.3d 345, 364 (D.D.C. 2007).
81
See, e.g., Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 562 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding
that, at least for some claims, the U.S. had already established a process for securing reparations stemming from holocaust-era property theft); Joo v. Japan, 172 F.
Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001).
82
See, e.g., Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1169
(C.D. Cal. 2005).
83
See, e.g., Mujica, 381 F. Supp.2d at 1188.
84
See, e.g., id. at 1188.
85
See, e.g., Matar v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting
that the State Department argues the suit would interfere with the United States
diplomatic effort in the Middle East).
86
Beaty v. Iraq, 480 F. Supp. 2d 60, 79 (D.D.C. 2007) (emphasis added).
80
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Part III and the discussion in Part IV reveal, courts focus particularly
on the factual “grounds” and less on the prongs of the Baker analysis.87
III. THE IMPACT OF EXECUTIVE STATEMENTS IN NINE
MAJOR ATS CASES
This Part looks at the major recent ATS cases in which the political question doctrine was invoked; with one exception,88 the executive branch sought to directly influence the court’s political question
determination. The survey covers nine ATS cases, generally considered the most important in recent years. Eight of these cases were
brought within the last decade and decided in the past five years. The
lone exception, Kadic v Karadzic, is included because it provides a
starting point from which the other cases emerge, and because it is one
of the few in which the executive branch—in this case the Clinton Administration—explicitly stated that the political question doctrine did
not apply.89 All but two involve corporate defendants; the others,
Kadic and Matar v. Dichter, are included also to demonstrate the extremes of ATS justiciability, and to bracket the more vague and uncertain corporate ATS cases.

87

See Developments in the Law, supra note 16, at 1196 (“The courts that have
expanded the political question doctrine have done so nominally within the bounds
of Baker’s categories, particularly favoring the last three. However, they have
looked to these categories almost as an afterthought; in each of the decisions
presented below, the real actuating force was a State Department determination
that the suit in question should not proceed. Naturally, this has yielded awkward
fits between fact and doctrine, as the Baker inquiry is dramatically relaxed to accommodate the deference granted to the executive branch.”) (citations omitted).
88
The defendant in Corrie v. Caterpillar sought to have the court solicit a State
Department letter, but the court refused. See Corrie v. Caterpiller, Inc., 503 F. 3d
974, 978 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Caterpillar moved for the district court to solicit the
State Department’s views, but the district court dismissed plaintiff’s claims without ever ruling on that motion. Had the United States filed a Statement of Interest, we would have given it ‘serious weight.’ ”).
89
This of course raises the issue of how courts should respond when the executive
branch says that the political question doctrine should not apply in a given case.
On one hand, a political question analysis is inherently legal, and thus the administration should not offer its legal analysis, at least at the trial level. On the other
hand, if the executive branch explicitly states that it has no interest in a matter, it
would appear as if the matter is left to the judiciary. I could find no case where the
courts have ruled for the existence of a political question over the objections of the
political branch, though there is no technical reason why such a case could not
arise.
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A. Method of Analysis
To determine (a) how the executive crafts its political question
argument, (b) how the courts address and respond to executive assertions, and, most importantly, (c) what, if any, common method of analysis has emerged from the courts’ decision making, it is necessary to
read the ATS cases with a particular focus on the language used by
both the executive branch (State Department) and the adjudicating
courts. This Part then focuses on the respective language (while the
next Part analyzes the courts’ methodology) by looking at three political question doctrine related elements of the major ATS cases: State
Department language, the rationale for justiciability/nonjusticiability,
and the courts’ holdings.
State Department Language. The language in the State Department
statements of interests is important for two reasons. First, it reveals
the executive branch’s assessment of potential foreign policy implications of the pending litigation. Second, and more importantly, it
reveals the degree of certainty with which the State Department believes that the litigation will have its projected effects. The Sarei court
noted this fact, explaining that “without the [statement of interest],
there would be little reason to dismiss this case on political question
grounds, and therefore . . . the SOI must carry the primary burden of
establishing a political question.”90 The courts rely to a significant degree on the persuasive languages within these letters and particularly
look to the executive’s certainty (or uncertainty) on the potential foreign policy implications. As the D.C. Circuit noted, much of the State
Department’s assessment is “necessarily predictive and contingent on
how the case might unfold.”91 The cases establish this point, as statement of interest language indicating the degree of State Department
assuredness becomes a central part of the courts’ political question
analysis.
Rationale for Justiciability/Nonjusticiability. While the exact rationale in the executive branch arguments for the applicability of the political question doctrine is of secondary concern—the courts rarely
distinguish one rationale from another in terms of importance or need
for deference— it does provide interesting commentary on the degree
to which the executive may stretch the foreign policy connection. For
example, the State Department’s contention in Mujica and In re South
African Apartheid Litigation that such lawsuits would have a “chilling
90

Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007).
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345, 354 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Exxon
Statement of Interest, supra note 1).

91

\\server05\productn\R\RGL\9-1\RGL104.txt

unknown

Seq: 20

12-FEB-10

12:49

104 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 9:1

effect on doing . . . business”92 reveals the inherent mushiness of such
pronouncements. After all, what lawsuit that had the potential to anger a foreign government might not potentially affect U.S. business
interests?
Courts’ Holdings. The courts’ holdings and reasonings naturally provide the keys to determining the standard by which they make their
political question decisions. As the opinions reveal, courts, while generally addressing the Baker factors, fixate on the language and definitiveness of the State Department letters and statements of interest.
The opinions also reveal the limits on what arguments the courts will
accept—they will not, for example, give weight to executive branch legal interpretations,93 nor do they accept that cases with foreign affairs
or international human rights implications are per se nonjusticiable.94
B. The Major Recent ATS Cases
The following table briefly breaks down nine major ATS cases
from recent years through the above-mentioned criteria. A more detailed analysis, including the appropriate excerpts of the letters and
court opinions (and with full citations), is presented in the Appendix.
TABLE: SUMMARY OF NINE MAJOR ATS CASES95
Case

Executive Branch
Concerns

Nonjusticiability
Argument

Court’s Holding and
Discussion

Kadic v. Karadzic

None. Executive
argues that political
question doctrine
(PQD) should not
apply.

N/A

Justiciable. Court
notes that while
Executive Branch (EB)
opinion is relevant, it
is not binding.

Mujica v. Occidental
Petroleum

Adjudication will have
adverse foreign policy
consequences.

Effect on bilateral
trade and relations
with Colombia.

Nonjusticiable.
Adjudication interferes
with EB’s approach to
96
managing this issue.

92

In re South African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2009);
see also Mujica Statement of Interest, supra note 2 (“Lawsuits such as the one
before Judge Rea have the potential for deterring present and future U.S. investment in Colombia”).
93
See In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 69 (E.D.N.Y.
2005) (“The judiciary is the branch of government to which claims based on international law has been committed.”).
94
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995).
95
See infra Appendix (providing citations and detailed explanations of cases,
important language, and holdings).
96
Note that although the court found that the political question doctrine did
apply, it based its ruling in part on a lower court’s decision in Sarei, which has
since been overturned. See discussion infra note 100 and accompanying text.
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In Re Agent Orange

Adjudication is essentially a challenge to
EB’s war-prosecution
powers.

President’s war-fighting powers let EB
make determination
about legality of certain tools/weapons.

Justiciable. An assessment of the proper
role of the courts in
overseeing the president’s actions, even if
those actions are nominally within EB’s powers.

Presbyterian Church of
Sudan v. Talisman

Canada protested the
case (against a Canadian corporation), and
EB agreed.

International comity
and preservation of relations between the
U.S. and the government of Canada.

Justiciable. Nexus
between the adjudication of the lawsuit
and EB’s foreign policy
concerns was too
vague.

Doe v. Exxon Mobil

“. . . [I]t is the [EB]’s
considered opinion that
adjudication at this
time could adversely
affect [U.S.] interest.”

Effect on bilateral
trade and antiterrorism cooperation
with Indonesia; chilling
effect on foreign direct
investment.

Justiciable. Because
the Department of
State was not completely sure that the
suit would infringe on
EB’s foreign policymaking capabilities, it
could not apply the
PQD.

Sarei v. Rio Tinto

In the DOS’s judgment,
adjudication would risk
threatening a Papua
New Guinea peace process.

Interference with the
internal domestic affairs of an American
ally.

Justiciable. Even
though EB wanted the
case to disappear, the
DOS did not explicitly
request dismissal on
PQD grounds.

Matar v. Dichter

Adjudication would undermine EB’s ability to
manage the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Threatens both the
management of the
peace process, and the
process itself.

Nonjusticiable. Here,
the DOS explicitly requested dismissal both
as necessary and on
PQD grounds.

Corrie v. Caterpillar

N/A. Though defendant requested that
the court solicit a DOS
letter, the court refused.

N/A

Nonjusticiable. Because tort in question
resulted from foreign
aid (EB domain), the
matter was a political
question.

In re South African
Apartheid Litig.

Adjudication would
Interference with bilatcompromise U.S. ineral relations with
vestment in South Afri- South Africa; chilling
ca, which is an EB for- effect on business.
eign policy tool.

Justiciable. The assertion that adjudication would have a chilling effect on business
is speculative at best.

While all of these cases discuss the political question doctrine
and thus help shape its jurisprudence in ATS cases, seven—Mujica,
Agent Orange, Talisman, Exxon Mobil, Sarei, Corrie and South African Apartheid—involve corporate defendants. While other cases, such
as Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum97 and Saleh v. Titan,98 have been
brought against corporate defendants, these seven remain the only to
97

226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding there to be jurisdiction in the case brought
by Nigerians against the petroleum company, but dismissing on forum non conveniens grounds).
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(a) provide political question analysis, (b) address or rely on evidence
provided by the executive branch through a State Department letter,
and (c) have a corporate defendant. Though the case law is then necessarily thin, the opinions share enough in common in their analyses to
provide clues on how courts will likely continue to adjudicate these
claims.99
Five of these remaining seven cases were found to be justiciable. One of the outliers, Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum, has since
been essentially overruled as it relies on previous incarnation of Sarei
that was recently overturned by the Ninth Circuit.100 The other, Corrie v. Caterpillar, is the only case in which a statement of interest was
not submitted. As the next Part demonstrates, the remaining cases
rely on a similar analysis; they also provide evidence of a break from
the previous Baker v. Carr analysis and chart a new method of adjudicating these claims.
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW, DEFERENCE-BASED
ANALYSIS
The previous nine cases, along with a few others mentioned
briefly throughout, are by no means the only important ATS cases, nor
do they provide definitive rules that necessarily bind future courts.
Moreover, all nine cases fall within the Second, Ninth, or D.C. Circuits, and thus, because the Supreme Court has yet to refine the ATS
and define levels of political question deference beyond its work in
Baker and Sosa, merely have persuasive effect outside their respective
jurisdictions.101
This said, it remains helpful to compare the similar reasoning
among the different courts to construct a single lens through which
they all analyze these cases. Because of the relative paucity of corporate ATS cases, particularly those in which the executive has weighed
in through a State Department letter or statement of interest, the
aforementioned cases are all with which commentators have to work.
98

436 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding no ATS jurisdiction over allegations of
human rights violations brought by Iraqi citizens against U.S. government
contractors).
99
See infra Part IV.
100
See generally Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007). In Mujica,
the court, in ruling the claim to be nonjusticiable, cited to Sarei and explained: “In
other cases, courts have restricted claims of crimes against humanity to more limited circumstances.” Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1183. As discussed, the district
court ruling in Sarei has since been overturned by the Ninth Circuit.
101
Because these three circuits are likely to deal with the vast majority of these
cases in the future.
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As such, an analysis combining the ideas and reasoning from these
different circuits remains appropriate at this time.
This Part discusses the new emerging consensus among courts
on how to decide the political question issue in corporate ATS cases.
First, it lays out the political question boundaries by looking at cases
where the court clearly decides that political questions do and do not
exist. It then shows how the courts have abandoned the Baker framework in favor of a new, more subjective dereference-based approach.
Finally, it explains how despite the appearance of increased deference
to the executive branch in these cases, courts have managed to maintain their authority and review.
A. The Limits of Political Questions in ATS Cases
Two cases, Kadic v. Karadzic and Corrie v. Caterpillar, demonstrate the outer boundaries of courts’ willingness to adjudicate claims
brought under the ATS. In Kadic, a 1995 case brought by Bosnian
Muslim and Croat victims of atrocities committed by Bosnia Serb
forces under control of the defendant Radovan Karadzic, the de facto
though non-internationally recognized head of the Bosnian Serb republic,102 the court not only built on Filartiga and set the course for
future ATS litigation, but also implied that when the executive branch
does not see the litigation interfering with a matter under its sole purview, a nonjusticiable political question does not exist.103 In this case,
the State Department explicitly noted that “dismissal of [the case]
under the ‘political question’ doctrine is not warranted,” implying that
102

See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 236 (2d Cir. 1995). The court even remarked on
the claim’s novelty, alluding to the historic nature of their opinion:
Most Americans would probably be surprised to learn that victims of atrocities committed in Bosnia are suing the leader of the
insurgent Bosnian-Serb forces in a United States District Court
in Manhattan. Their claims seek to build upon the foundation of
this Court’s decision in Filártiga v. Peña- Irala, which recognized
the important principle that the venerable Alien Tort Act, enacted in 1789 but rarely invoked since then, validly creates federal court jurisdiction for suits alleging torts committed
anywhere in the world against aliens in violation of the law of
nations.
Id.
103
Id. at 250 (“In a ‘Statement of Interest,’ . . . the United States has expressly
disclaimed any concern that the political question doctrine should be invoked to
prevent the litigation of these lawsuits . . . . Though even an assertion of the political question doctrine by the Executive Branch, entitled to respectful consideration,
would not necessarily preclude adjudication, the Government’s reply to our inquiry reinforces our view that adjudication may properly proceed.”).
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adjudication did not infringe on its foreign policy making abilities.104
The court agreed. Kadic thus demarcates the end of the spectrum at
which a political question does not exist.
While Kadic brackets one end of ATS political question cases,
Corrie v. Caterpillar brackets the other. In this case, brought on behalf of Palestinian civilians and an American peace activist killed in
Gaza by an Israeli bulldozer, the plaintiffs brought suit against the
bulldozer’s manufacturer claiming that the corporation “knew or
should have known that the bulldozers it was supplying to [Israel]
would be used to commit violations of [international law].”105 While
the Israeli army committed the acts, the act of state doctrine and doctrine of sovereign immunity prevented suit against Israeli officials.
Caterpillar Corporation, which manufactured the bulldozers, proved
then to be the only potential litigation target.
Though the district court ruled (on the merits) that Caterpillar’s actions did not violate international law,106 the Ninth Circuit, on
appeal, clarified the political question implications. Following its previous decision in Alperin v. Vatican National Bank,107 the Corrie court
reaffirmed the notion that pure foreign policy decisions should be left
to the elected branches. Because in this case the U.S. government had
purchased the bulldozers and given them to Israel—a decision made
by the executive branch pursuant to its foreign affairs powers—Caterpillar’s sale was subsumed into a concrete U.S. policy decision, and not
justiciable. Simply put, actions performed directly and unambiguously
within a constitutionally derived power are not matters for the court.
As in this case, “[a] court could not find in favor of the plaintiffs with-

104

U.S. State Department Statement of Interest, Kadic v. Karadzic, Sep. 13, 1995
[hereinafter Kadic Statement of Interest]. An interesting aside is the catch
twenty-two that a statement by the executive that the political question doctrine
does not apply is not really a legal argument, but a statement on the litigation not
affecting the executive’s ability to conduct foreign policy. Conversely, an argument that the political question doctrine should apply is an inherently legal argument, which the courts are loath to accept. Thus, it would seem that there could
never be a case where the executive argues that there is no political question but is
overruled by the court. A discussion of this dilemma, however, is beyond the scope
of this article.
105
Corrie v. Caterpillar, 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1023 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
106
Id. at 1028–29.
107
410 F.3d 532, 559 (9th Cir. 2005). Alperin reaffirmed the idea that “cases interpreting the broad textual grants of authority to the President and Congress in
the areas of foreign affairs leave only a narrowly circumscribed role for the Judiciary.” Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 982 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Alperin, 410 F.3d at 559).
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out implicitly questioning, and even condemning, United States foreign policy toward Israel.”108
B. Courts Have Abandoned Baker in Corporate ATS Cases
While Kadic and Corrie delineate the boundaries of political
questions in ATS cases, the courts in those cases also provide insight
into how courts are moving away from the six-factor test created by
the Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr. Both courts spend little time
looking at the Baker factors, but rather divide them into two groups:
the first three Baker factors,109 which are reduced to the question of
whether the matter before the court is a violation of international
law;110 and the last three Baker factors,111 which are really three separate ways of asking the question of whether adjudication infringes on
the executive’s ability to conduct the nation’s foreign affairs.112 The
Corrie court, reiterating the opinion in Alperin, observed that “[the
Baker tests] are more discrete in theory than in practice, with the
analyses often collapsing into one another.”113 This reduction essentially obviates the need to address each Baker factor, and leads in
these cases to a de facto creation of two questions: (1) is the claim
based on a violation of international law, and (2) does adjudication of
the claim unconstitutionally intrude on the executive’s foreign policymaking powers and abilities? The first question provides a baseline
108

Corrie, 503 F.3d at 984. A similar holding resulted in Matar v. Dichter, where
a New York District Court found a suit against the Israeli government, predicated
on issues similar to that in Corrie, was nonjusticiable on political-question
grounds. The Matar court found that a suit against the Israeli government would
“impede the Executive’s diplomatic efforts” at resolving the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. Matar v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
109
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S 186, 217 (1962). The first three Baker factors are: “[1]
a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion. . . .” Id.
110
See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[U]niversally recognized norms of international law provide judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for adjudicating suits brought under the [ATCA], which obviates the
need to make initial policy decisions of the kind normally reserved for nonjudicial
discretion.”).
111
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. The last three Baker factors are, “[4] the impossibility
of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question. . . .” Id.
112
See Corrie, 503 F.3d at 983.
113
Id. (quoting Alperin, 410 F.3d at 544).
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jurisdictional hoop, while the second requires a deeper level of inquiry,
and is where the executive branch’s letters and statements of interest
matter most.
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc. provides an example of this new analysis. In this case, brought by Sudanese villagers against a Canadian oil company for aiding the Sudanese
government in the commission of “genocide, crimes against humanity,
and other violations of international law,”114 the court noted that the
“plaintiffs seek a tort remedy under the ATCA for gross human rights
violations,” and that “universally recognized norms of international
law are also present in the instant case.”115 This was a “first question”
ruling that the matter involved serious violations of of international
law. The court, in a follow-up opinion dedicated solely to answering
the second question, then found, after scrutinizing the State Department’s letter and the potential implications of the lawsuit, that “Talisman is . . . at pains to identify United States foreign policies towards
Sudan with which this action interferes” and that the case will not
have an “impact on United States foreign policy towards Sudan or Canada.”116 In this last calculation, the court did not discuss, apply, or
even mention the Baker factors.
Likewise, in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, a case with facts similar to
those in Talisman, the Ninth Circuit ruled similarly, breaking Baker
into two lines of inquiry. It addressed and disposed of the first question by noting, “[g]iven that plaintiffs have properly alleged cognizable
ATCA claims, it is not tenable to insist that the claims themselves are
not entrusted to the judiciary.”117 Regarding the second question, the
court followed the Second Circuit, explaining that “[t]he fourth, fifth
and sixth Baker factors are relevant in an ATCA case ‘if judicial resolution of a question would contradict prior decisions taken by a political branch in those limited contexts where such contradiction would
seriously interfere with important governmental interests.’”118 The
court then ruled, without performing a separate analysis for each factor, that adjudication does not unconstitutionally infringe on the executive’s domain, despite the State Department’s letter indicating that
litigation “would risk a potentially serious adverse impact on . . . the
conduct of our foreign relations.”119 Instead, the court noted, “To de114

Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 2005 WL 2082846 at
*1 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
115
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289,
348 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
116
Talisman, 2005 WL 2082846 at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
117
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1204 (9th Cir. 2007).
118
Id. (quoting Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995)).
119
Sarei Statement of Interest, supra note 3, at 2; Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, No.
2:00CV11695 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2001) (emphasis added).
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termine whether [the final three Baker] factors are present, we must
first decide how much weight to give the State Department’s statement of interest.”120 As the next section demonstrates, courts have
created a process to do this.
C. A New Two-Step, Deference-Based Approach
In ATS cases, the first of these two questions is generally quite
easy. As the court in South African Apartheid Litigation noted, “The
first three Baker factors will almost never apply in ATCA suits, which
are committed to the judiciary by statute and utilize standards set by
universally recognized norms of customary international law.”121 As
such, the cases generally come down to the second, more difficult
question.
The judicial attempt to answer this second question—whether
adjudication on the matter unconstitutionally affects the executive’s
foreign policy-making abilities—frequently comes down to the letter or
statement of interest. The D.C. Circuit, in a dissenting opinion in Doe
v. Exxon Mobil Corp. to which the majority explicitly notes its agreement,122 explained the problem:
Courts are not well-equipped to determine on their own
. . . whether a particular civil case would have a negative
impact on U.S. foreign policy and should be dismissed. In
part for that reason, as the Supreme Court has instructed, courts give deference to the Executive Branch
when the Executive reasonably explains that adjudication of a particular civil lawsuit would adversely affect
the foreign policy interests of the United States.123
The key language is “reasonably explains,” which goes to the degree to
which the adjudication affects U.S. foreign policy-making, and establishes whether courts find the existence of a political question. The
majority opinion noted as much, implying that a key to interpreting an
executive letter or statement of interest in these cases involves “the
120

Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1204; see also Michael J. O’Donnell, Note, A Turn for the
Worse: Foreign Relations, Corporate Human Rights Abuse, and the Courts, 24 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 223 (2004); Thomas R, Sutcliffe, Note, “The Nile Reconstituted”:
Executive Statements, International Human Rights Litigation, and the Political
Question Doctrine, 89 B.U. L .REV 295 (2009).
121
In re South African Apartheid Litig. 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
122
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345, 356 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[W]e note that we
have entered no holding inconsistent with our dissenting colleague’s doctrinal
views on deference owed the executive in matters of foreign policy.”).
123
Id. at 360 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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nature, extent, and intrusiveness of discovery” as pronounced by the
State Department.124
The issue of whether the courts have adopted this deferencebased approach is uncontested. In all of these cases—Exxon, Sarei,
Talisman, South African Apartheid Litigation, among others—the
courts unquestionably defer to the State Department’s interpretation
of the case’s potential foreign policymaking effects. Five courts explicitly follow the Second Circuit’s decision in Kadic to give statements of
interest “serious weight.”125 Yet at the same time, and despite express
State Department support for dismissal, the courts, with one now preempted exception (Mujica), refused to rule the claims nonjusticiable.
Instead, although they did defer to the executive’s opinions, the courts
managed to create degrees of deference, instead of following the executive outright.
To determine the degree of deference to be given to executive
statements of interests in corporate ATS cases, courts have begun using the State Department’s degree of certainty as a proxy for amount
of deference due. The D.C. Circuit began such analysis with a baseline
standard: “[W]e need not decide what level of deference would be owed
to a letter from the State Department that unambiguously requests
that the district court dismiss a case as a non-justiciable political question.”126 While such a pronouncement appears to give the executive
undue deference—the political question doctrine requires a legal determination, a decision constitutionally granted to the judiciary—it
can be interpreted as granting deference only when the State Department explicitly finds that a case will indisputably affect U.S. foreign
policy-making abilities. The court in South African Apartheid held as
such, explaining that it will give serious consideration to the executive’s views only with regard to the case’s “impact on foreign policy,”
but that “deference does not mean delegation; the views of the Executive Branch—even where deference is due—are but one factor to consider and are not dispositive.”127
124

Id. at 356 (majority opinion).
See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e will
give the view in the SOI ‘serious weight.’ ”); Exxon Mobile, 473 F.3d at 354; Corrie
v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 978 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting as such despite
the court not having solicited a State Department letter); In re South African
Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 280; Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum, 381 F.
Supp. 2d 1164, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
126
Exxon Mobil, 473 F.3d at 354. This follows the reasoning discussed in relation
to Kadic v. Karadzic, in which certainty that an adjuciation does not affect the
executive’s foreign policymaking abilities results in the court understandably
agreeing with (or deferring to) the executive. See discussion supra notes 102–03
and accompanying text.
127
In re South African Apartheid Litig., F. Supp. 2d 228, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
125

\\server05\productn\R\RGL\9-1\RGL104.txt

unknown

Seq: 29

12-FEB-10

2010] POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN CORPORATE ATS CASES

12:49

113

Yet the State Department is only so prescient, and can rarely
know with certainty exactly how a case may or will affect U.S. foreign
policy-making. Consequently, courts have fixated on statement-of-interest language indicating ambiguity, and inversely decreased their
level of deference as the level of State Department ambiguity
increases:
• In Talisman, the court refused to rule the suit nonjusticiable, finding that “neither the Statement nor the State Letter
contend that this lawsuit will threaten or interfere with U.S.
foreign policy . . . , [nor] that this lawsuit is frustrating or will
frustrate United States foreign policy towards Canada. Therefore, nothing in the Statement necessitates revisiting this
issue.”128
• In Sarei, the Ninth Circuit overturned a lower court decision and pointed to the statement of interest’s “guarded nature” and its “nonspecific invocations of risks to the [Papua
New-Guinea] peace process” in finding the case justiciable.129
• In Exxon Mobil, the D.C. Circuit, in finding that the political question doctrine did not apply, found that the State Department letter “contained several important qualifications . . .
[,] noted that the effects of this suit on U.S. foreign policy interests ‘cannot be determined with certainty’ . . . [, and] emphasized that whether this case would adversely affect U.S. foreign
policy depends upon ‘the nature, extent, and intrusiveness of
discovery.’”130 Furthermore, the court noted that “given the
letter before us in the record, we cannot say it is ‘indisputable’
that the district court erroneously failed to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims under the political question doctrine, no matter
what level of deference is owed to the State Department’s
letter.”131
• In In re South African Apartheid Litigation, the Southern District of New York found claims against businesses accused of aiding the South African apartheid government not
barred by the political question doctrine, and the State Department’s letter to the court unpersuasive.132 The court held that
that “the Executive Branch’s views will not prevail if they are
‘presented in a largely vague and speculative manner’ or if the
Executive’s concerns are not ‘severe enough or raised with the
128

Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 2005 WL 2082846, at
*8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005) (emphasis added).
129
Sarei, 487 F.3d at 1206.
130
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345, 354 (D.D.C. 2007).
131
Id.
132
In re South African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 284.
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level of specificity required to justify . . . a dismissal on foreign
policy grounds.’”133
• In Mujica, on the other hand, the court found the existence of nonjusticiable political questions, and, relying on “the
U.S. State Department’s Supplemental Statement of Interest,
[found that] allowing Plaintiffs to pursue these state law
claims would interfere with several of its foreign policy
goals.”134 Key to it decision was the certainty that the case
“would interfere” with current U.S. relations with Colombia, in
which the alleged violations of international law had occurred.135 However, two important points regarding Mujica
must be raised. First, the court found none of the first three
Baker factors to exist, thus finding an adjudicable matter of
law.136 Second, and most importantly, the opinion relied to a
good extent on the district court’s political-question holding in
Sarei,137 which has since been overturned on appeal.138
Such analysis indicates a clear trend in the courts’ deference to
these letters and statements. Although the cases generally discuss
some of the Baker factors—quickly passing on the first three and then
aggregating the final three—the ultimate justiciability decisions in
these corporate ATS cases depend on the clarity, specificity, and perceived accuracy of the State Department in its letters and statements
of interest.139 In finding any modicum of State Department doubt or
uncertainty to immediately prevent the application of a political question, the courts have thus far refused to cede review.140 The courts’
decision to look at the actual words of the statement of interest indicates that they are doing their job by adhering to its constitutional
power of review instead of acceding to the growing power of the executive branch. Whether this was a response to Bush administration executive aggrandizement or merely a logical means of interpreting an
inherently murky doctrine, the courts demonstrated their willingness
to bend a doctrine to ensure a workable means of adjudication.141
133

Id. at 282.
Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1188 (C.D. Cal. 2005)
(emphasis added).
135
Id.
136
Id. at 1195.
137
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal 2002), rev’d in part,
Sarei, 456 F.3d 1069.
138
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
139
See Matar v. Dichter, 500 F. Supp. 2d 284, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
140
See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007).
141
See Belgrade v. Sidex Int’l Furniture Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d. 407, 416 (S.D.N.Y.
1998).
134

\\server05\productn\R\RGL\9-1\RGL104.txt

unknown

Seq: 31

12-FEB-10

2010] POLITICAL QUESTIONS IN CORPORATE ATS CASES

12:49

115

Contrary to the fears of some commentators,142 courts have apparently
managed to prevent the executive from completely chiseling away at
the ATS and unconstitutionally intruding into the judiciary’s domain.
Yet there remains some concern, not only because of the limited case law, but also because this new deference-based approach provides the executive branch with clear instructions on how to ensure
nonjusticibility. All the State Department would have to do, it seems,
is provide the court with definitive proof—or perhaps merely a very
high degree of certainty—that a future ATS adjudication will negatively impact some aspect of U.S. foreign policy.143 While the Obama
administration will likely take a softer stance toward the ATS than
the Bush administration—evident in President Obama’s nomination of
Harold Koh, a proponent of both international law144 and what he
calls “transnational public law litigation”145—both it and future administrations will likely be caught between foreign policy obligations
and American courts. Although courts have so far established a workable means to restrict executive involvement, such a détente may not
ultimately last.
V. THE NEXT STEP: WHY COURTS MUST HOLD THE LINE,
AND HOW THEY CAN DO SO
Thus far, this article has attempted to demonstrate that in corporate ATS cases courts have moved beyond the Baker analysis to a
two-question approach. It has only speculated on why this new approach has taken hold. Dismissals of executive branch arguments can
be interpreted as either a response to executive branch overreach, or
as judicial support for an expanded (or non-diminished) ATS, or both.
Given the reluctance of federal judges to engage in policy discussions,

142

See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 16, at 808 (“Through submission of State Department statements of interest in [ATS] cases, the Bush Administration now routinely intervenes in litigation brought to vindicate serious human rights abuses by
seeking dismissal on behalf of powerful corporate defendants.”).
143
See Matar, 500 F. Supp. 2d. at 295–96.
144
See Ronald Slye, International Law Exists – Which is Why We Need Harold
Koh, FOREIGN POLICY, Apr. 20, 2009, http://experts.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/
04/20/international_law_exists_which_is_why_we_need_harold_koh (last visited
Oct. 13, 2009).
145
Harold Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE L. J 2347, 2398
(1991) (“In short, even functioning largely as an adjunct to the traditional model of
dispute-resolution, the model of transnational public law litigation can play an
enormously useful role in providing relief for individuals, even as it spurs the recognition of developing global norms.”).
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it would appear that for courts, the separation of powers concern is of
prime importance.146
This final Part looks at the new aforementioned two-question
up-or-down adjudication, focusing particularly on two separation of
powers concerns. First, it argues that courts must prevent executive
branch aggrandizement by refusing to allow the executive to make decisions for them, even if the executive is in the best position to assess
potential foreign policy-making implications.147 Second, although the
executive has the best ability to assess potential ramifications of corporate ATS adjudication, courts are in the best position to make unbiased political question calculations, and must thus continue to refrain
from accepting wholeheartedly the executive’s conclusions. Courts exist for a reason, and are vested with the tools and independence to
make legal determinations;148 as such, they should be given the resources needed to properly weigh issues. This Part concludes with a
discussion of how this could feasibly occur.
A. Separation of Powers Concerns
1. Preventing Executive Branch Aggrandizement
It is well accepted that the President (and to a lesser extent the
Congress) coordinates and executes the nation’s foreign policy.149 The
Second and Ninth Circuits, where nearly all of the corporate ATS
146

See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004). (“[T]he potential implications for the foreign relations of the United States of recognizing such causes
should make courts particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and Executive Branches . . . .”). But see id. at 733 n.21 (conditioning this
approach by affording only “case-specific deference to the political branches . . . .”).
147
The Court has, of course, held that there are times when deference is required.
See, e.g., Reagan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 223 (1984) (finding the executive best
suited to determine the necessity of economic and travel restrictions with Cuba);
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 1 (1965) (holding that the Secretary of State had the
authority to impose travel restrictions).
148
Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116
YALE L. J. 1230, 1233 (2007) (arguing that excessive deference to executive branch
interpretations would “radically expand the authority of the executive to interpret
and, in effect, to break foreign relations law.”). But see Eric A. Posner & Cass R.
Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1177 (2007)
(“[C]ourts should play a smaller role than they currently do in interpreting statutes that touch on foreign relations [and] that the executive branch should be
given greater power than it currently has to decide whether the United States will
violate international law”).
149
See United States. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)
(“[The President] manages our concerns with foreign nations and must necessarily
be most competent to determine when, how, and upon what subjects negotiation
may be urged with the greatest prospect of success.); THE FEDERALIST NO. 84
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cases fall, understand this and accordingly have in general accepted
executive branch interpretations of foreign policy matters under consideration. For example, in Taiwan v. United States District Court
and Mingtai Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. United Parcel Service, the
Ninth Circuit accepted executive interpretations regarding the political status of Taiwan, stating that the United States’ position was “entitled to substantial deference in light of the primacy of the Executive in
the conduct of foreign relations and the Executive Branch’s lead role in
foreign policy . . . .”150 Likewise, in Mora v. New York, a non-corporate
ATS case, the Second Circuit accepted State and Justice Department
determinations that the failure to provide an arrested alien with certain consular rights was not a violation of customary international law
(though it also noted that such agency determinations are “not conclusive”).151 In matters requiring a foreign policy determination—such
as whether a certain country falls within the jurisdiction of a treaty, or
whether travel bans to a particular part of the world are valid—courts
understandably defer to the executive, as most foreign policy decisions
are in fact political questions that themselves cannot be adjudicated by
the judiciary.152
That deference, however, is distinguishable from the deference
sought by the executive in corporate ATS cases. What the executive
seeks in ATS cases is not respect for constitutionally sanctioned executive foreign affairs policy-making,153 but a wholesale transfer of legal
adjudication from the judiciary to the executive, or what one commentator sees as “turning ‘respectful deference’ into uncritical deference.”154 In cases like Taiwan, Mingtai, and Mora, the courts’
deference had little to do with adjudication, but rather was predicated
(“Even the management of foreign negotiations will naturally devolve upon [the
President] . . . .”).
150
Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United Parcel Service, 177 F.3d 1142, 1147
(9th Cir. 1999) (quoting First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S.
759, 767 (1972)); Taiwan v. United States District Court, 128 F.3d 712, 718 (9th
Cir. 1997) (quoting First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759,
767 (1972)).
151
Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 204–08 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Sumitomo
Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184 (1982)).
152
See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(finding the president’s decision to suspend a treaty to be within his constitutional
purview, and thus not adjudicable).
153
Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. REV. 309, 353 (2006) (“Specifically, the principle that the
national government has exclusive control over foreign affairs does not mean that
the president alone can exercise all national powers that may touch on the field.”).
154
Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration’s Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169, 201 (2004).
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on deference to an executive interpretation of a matter of foreign policy
integral to the merits of the case. Similarly, in cases like Bancoult v.
McNamara, in which the legitimacy of executive branch decisions—in
this case, the U.S. decision to deport a group of Indian Ocean islanders
to make way for a military base—was itself on trial, courts generally
find that the action falls squarely within the domain of the executive,
and is thus nonjusticiable.155 In ATS cases—in fact in all cases involving individual liberties156—particularly in those corporate ATS cases
discussed herein, no executive action or executive interpretation of a
foreign policy matter are of any concern. Rather, in these cases,
though its foreign policy concerns are no doubt real, the executive
should at most be able to voice its concerns, not expect the courts to
defer to its judgment. Anything more would be unjust—and unconstitutional—judicial deference to the executive branch.157
2. Only the Judiciary can Adjudicate Matters of Law
The political question doctrine, especially as analyzed by the
courts in the ATS cases discussed in this article, is unique in that
while applying the doctrine is a matter of law, doing so requires the
court to make a factual determination; namely, does the case unreasonably affect the executive’s ability to conduct the nation’s foreign affairs? Such a determination is not necessarily easy. As the dissent in
Baker noted, “a controversy affecting the Nation’s foreign affairs is not
a simple mechanical matter . . . .”158 In this vein, how can immediate
deference to the executive’s understandably biased opinion159 settle an
inherently complex question? Though the Baker Court accepted that
many cases involving foreign policy “uniquely demand [a] single-voiced
155

See Bancoult v. McNamara, 370 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3–4 (D.C. 2004).
See Choper, supra note 44, at 1487 (noting that “the equation changes when a
matter of individual rights is involved”).
157
Some Presidents have disagreed. Under the Bush Administration’s unitary
executive theory, a discussion of which is well beyond the scope of this Article, any
matter affecting or relating to the President’s powers—foreign policy among
them—falls within the executive branch’s purview. See John E. Finn, Book Review, 18 L. & POL. BOOK. REV. 956 (2008), http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/reviews/2008/10/terror-presidency-law-and-judgment.html (“The unitary theory of
the executive holds that Article II vests the whole of executive power in the office
of the presidency and that such powers are not shared with other branches or
even, necessarily, accountable to them.”). This theory, however, has been criticized by members of the legal academy. See, e.g., David J. Barron & Martin S.
Lederman, The Commander In Chief At The Lowest Ebb — Framing The Problem,
Doctrine, And Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008).
158
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 283 n.11 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
159
The Bush Administration made no secret of its distaste for the ATS. See
Hermer & Day, supra note 5.
156
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statement of the Government’s views,”160 many others do not. Distinguishing these two sets of cases, and adjudicating those that do not
“uniquely demand” deference, cannot be left to an inherently interested party, even if that party is the President of the United States.
As discussed, the dissent (with which the majority agreed) in
Doe v. Exxon sought to create an answer to this problem in corporate
ATS cases.161 It noted that as a matter of law, “[w]hen presented with
a suit alleging wrongdoing committed in a foreign country, and particularly a suit implicating the actions of foreign government officials,
federal courts should dismiss the complaint on justiciability grounds if
the Executive Branch has reasonably explained that the suit would
harm U.S. foreign policy interests.”162 However, herein lies the danger. In Judge Kavanaugh’s (dissenting) opinion, a harm reasonably
explained by the executive is sufficient to render a suit justiciable. Yet
there exists a difference between a harm reasonably explained and a
reasonable explanation. Only the latter accords with Baker’s holding
that “it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance.”163
The necessary conclusion is that courts must not look at
whether the executive has “reasonably explained” the suit’s likely
harm, but rather at whether the explanation itself is reasonable. It is
acceptable that the executive, in charge of the nation’s foreign policy,
will best know the likely foreign policy implications of an ATS lawsuit;
but it is not acceptable that such a vantage point confers unquestioned
authority. Though courts should continue to give the executive’s opinions “serious weight,”164 they must still weigh them, even if they do
place them on the longer arm of the scale.
B. How Courts can Properly Weigh Executive Concerns
1. The Problem
As discussed in Part IV, the move away from a strict Baker
analysis in ATS cases to a more streamlined two-prong test has resulted in justiciability hinging on the second of the two questions—
does the adjudication of the claim unconstitutionally intrude on the
executive’s foreign policymaking powers and abilities? While the D.C.
Circuit would allow this question to be settled by a reasonable State
Department explanation, such “uncritical deference”165 raises serious
160

Baker, 268 U.S. at 211.
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345, 357 (D.D.C. 2007) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
162
Id. at 363.
163
Baker, 268 U.S. at 211.
164
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004).
165
See Stephens, supra note 18, at 191.
161

\\server05\productn\R\RGL\9-1\RGL104.txt

unknown

Seq: 36

12-FEB-10

12:49

120 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 9:1

separation of powers concerns. Instead, to determine whether a case is
nonjusticiable because its adjudication impairs the president’s ability
to conduct the nation’s foreign policy, the court must decide not
whether the State Department has provided a reasonable explanation
of the likely harm, but whether the potential harm is inherently real.
The courts in Sarei, Exxon Mobil, and Rio Tinto were able to make
such a calculation with relative ease because in each of those cases,
the executive, through the State Department’s statement of interest,
did not claim that adjudication was certain to harm the executive’s
foreign policy-making ability. In Mujica, on the other hand, the district court found that the statement of interest explaining that “this
case will have an adverse impact on the foreign policy interests of the
United States”166 to be dispositive, and ruled the claim nonjusticiable.
The executive has no doubt noticed this distinction. Mujica then foreshadows the executive’s argumentation in future cases that it does not
want adjudicated.
The problem with such definitive statements of fact—“this case
will have an adverse impact”—is that cases and their effects always
contain inherent uncertainty. Witness the executive’s change in certainty from a recent opinion in the rehearing of Sarei v. Rio Tinto.167
The State Department claimed in its 2001 statement of interest that
adjudication “would risk a potentially serious adverse impact on . . .
the conduct of our foreign relations.”168 Yet the executive later reversed course, finding the “foreign relations interests . . . as they existed in 2001 [to be] different from the interests and circumstances
that exist today.”169 While there is nothing remarkable about the executive changing its opinion at a later time, doing so presents a problem. The executive’s prediction about potential harm either changed
or did not come true, indicating the inherent uncertainty in an executive prediction regardless of how definitive it may seem.
2. A Solution
The result of this inherent uncertainty must require courts to
reassess the degree to which they defer to executive branch judgments.
They must find some way to assess the validity of State Department
claims. Fortunately, the solution may be relatively simple.
An easy way courts could accomplish this is by seeking verification of executive branch assertions. Upon the receipt of an executive
branch brief or statement of interest—which, under 28 U.S.C. § 517,
166

Mujica Statement of Interest, supra note 2; Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum,
381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1169 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
167
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 2009 WL 2762635 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
168
Sarei Statement of Interest, supra note 3.
169
Sarei, 2009 WL 2762635 at *9.
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the executive branch is allowed to submit either with or without solicitation—the court could make the executive’s assertions available to
the parties at suit and seek briefing, or even testimony, on the factual
foreign policy matters at hand. While this would allow the parties to
seek their own foreign policy advisors to weigh in substantively on the
executive’s letter, a more efficient solution might also be for courts to
circumvent the parties and seek briefing directly from amici or courtordered witnesses. Though rarely seen at trial this would allow independent experts to weigh in on both the executive’s statements and the
potential foreign policy implications.170 While courts must still afford
the executive a certain level of critical deference and treat its contentions with greater regard than those of independent experts,171 they
would then be able to make an independent assessment of cases’ potential effects, and decide if they are sufficient to trigger the political
question doctrine.
CONCLUSION
The discussion in this article is, to some degree, speculative. In
the absence of a Supreme Court ruling, courts cannot completely abandon Baker in corporate ATS cases. Nevertheless, they have in fact
strayed from that framework and moved towards a simpler means of
inquiry. This article seeks to highlight this movement, and note the
potential ramifications of this new approach.
The current case law provides reason for concern. Exxon Mobil
and other cases indicate that courts will likely defer to the executive
when the State Department can guarantee detrimental foreign policy
implications. Yet the case law also provides hope in that courts have
almost unanimously ignored the executive’s pleas for dismissal by requiring absolute certainty—something the State Department knows is
rarely possible. While the courts can and should continue to respect
and accept State Department opinions and afford them deference, they
must also make efforts to actually weigh executive statements with
other, independently sourced information. By deferring solely to executive branch analysis in these cases, courts cannot perform the due
diligence needed to assess the true likelihood of their impact on executive foreign policymaking. Unless they have all the facts, and unless
they actually weigh them, courts cannot make honest political question assessments.
170
Courts have the power to call their own witnesses under Federal Rule of Evidence 706. This rule allows the courts to “appoint any expert witnesses agreed
upon by the parties, and . . . appoint expert witnesses of [their] own selection.”
FED. R. EVID. 706.
171
The executive’s opinion is still due “serious weight.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 733 (2004).
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APPENDIX: MAJOR CORPORATE ATS CASES IN DETAIL

Case Name &
Factual
background
Kadic v. Karadzic
(2d Cir. 1995)
Bosnian citizens of
Croat and Muslim
descent bring suit
against the “president” of the BosniaSerb Republic on
charges that troops
under his command
committed tortuous
acts, genocide,
atrocities, and other
crimes in violation
of international law
and the laws of
war.

172
173

State Department
Letter or Statement of Interest—
Date & Important
Language
September 13, 1995
“Although there
might be instances
in which federal
courts are asked to
issue rulings under
the Alien Tort Statute or the Torture
Victim Protection
Act that might raise
a political question,
this is not one of
172
them.”

Rationale for
Justiciability/
Nonjusticiability
None. The U.S.
Government (Justice Department) informed the court
that, in its opinion,
the political questions doctrine simply did not apply.

See Kadic Statement of Interest, supra note 104.
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249–50 (2d Cir. 1995).

Court’s Holding
and Rationale
(and important
and operative
language)
Justiciable. In
finding the case justiciable, the court
makes sure to note
that the Executive
branch’s contention
that the political
question doctrine
does not apply is
relevant, but by no
means dispositive:
“Not every case
‘touching foreign relations’ is nonjusticiable, and judges
should not reflexively invoke these doctrines to avoid difficult and somewhat
sensitive decisions
in the context of
human rights. We
believe a preferable
approach is to
weigh carefully the
relevant considerations on a case-bycase basis.
...
Though even an assertion of the political question doctrine by the Executive Branch, entitled to respectful
consideration,
would not necessarily preclude adjudication, the Government’s reply to our
inquiry reinforces
our view that adjudication may prop173
erly proceed.”
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Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum
(C.D. Cal. 2005)
Colombian citizens
bring suit against
the defendant oil
company and a private security contractor, stemming
from an incident in
which the contractor, in coordination
with the Colombian
Air Force and on a
mission to protect
Occidental’s oil facility, dropped a
bomb that killed
seventeen civilians.

174
175
176

December 23, 2004
“[T]he State Department believes that
the adjudication of
this case will have
an adverse impact
on the foreign policy
interests of the
United States . . .
[and] could potentially have negative
consequences for
[the] bilateral relationship with the
Colombian government.
...
Colombia is one of
the United States’
closest allies in this
hemisphere, and
our partner in the
vital struggles
against terrorism
and narcotics trafficking.
...
[Such l]awsuits . . .
have the potential
for deterring present and future
U.S. investment in
Colombia.”
The statement also
included a letter
from the Colombian
government that
stated, “any decision in this case
may affect the relations between Colombia and the
[United States].”174

U.S. has substantial
interests in Columbia, and adjudication will in general
negatively impact
bilateral relations.
Adjudication might
also affect Colombia’s willingness to
accept U.S. foreign
investment, as well
as their cooperation
in counterterrorism
and counternarcotics operations.

12:49
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Nonjusticiable.
The court found
that the fourth and
fifth Baker factors—
impossibility of adjudicating without
affording proper respect to the other
branches of government, and adherence to a policy decision—apply because adjudication
would interfere with
“the Executive’s
preferred approach
of handling the
Santo Domingo
bombing and relations with Colombia
in general.”175
Note that the court
came to this decision in great part
by analogizing to
the initial decision
in Sarei v. Rio
Tinto, which was
overturned by the
Ninth Circuit (see
later in this table
for full discussion),
and that on appeal,
the Ninth Circuit
ordered the case to
be reheard in light
of the decision in
Sarei.176
“In Sarei, the court
dismissed plaintiffs’
case on political
question grounds.
In that case, the
State Department
filed a Statement of
Interest indicating
that allowing the
plaintiffs to proceed
with their case
would interfere with
the efforts of the
Papua New Guinea
and American governments to reach a

Mujica Statement of Interest, supra note 2, at 1–3.
Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum, 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1194 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum, 564 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2009).
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peaceful end to the
conflict giving rise
to the suit. The
court concluded that
allowing the case to
proceed, in the face
of such a Statement
of Interest, would
implicate the fourth
and sixth Baker factors.
...
In the instant case,
the State Department has filed a
Statement of Interest outlining several
areas of foreign policy that would be
negatively impacted
by proceeding with
the instant case. In
addition, as outlined in that letter,
the State Department has expressed
its view that this
litigation would interfere with its approach to encouraging the protection of
human rights in Colombia.
. . . the fourth Baker factor applies to
the instant case because proceeding
with the litigation
would indicate a
‘lack of respect’ for
the Executive’s preferred approach of
handling the Santo
Domingo bombing
and relations with
Colombia in general.”177

177

Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1193–94.
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In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation
(E.D.N.Y. 2005)
Vietnamese citizens
bring suit against
corporate manufacturers of the Agent
Orange defoliant
used during the Vietnam War, seeking
compensation for
damage to themselves and their
lands.

Jan. 15, 2005.
“At bottom, this litigation seeks to challenge the means by
which the United
States prosecuted
the Vietnam war,
and ineluctably
draws into issue the
President’s constitutional Commander
in Chief authorities
and invites impermissible secondguessing of the Executive’s war-making decisions. . . .
[T]he Executive
branch considered –
and repeatedly rejected – the contention that the use of
chemical herbicides
in Vietnam constituted a violation of
the laws of war.
...
[A]djudication of
plaintiffs’ international law claims
would require this
Court to pass upon
the validity of the
President’s decisions regarding
combat tactics and
weaponry”
. . . [B]ecause the
Executive branch
considered the very
questions of customary international
law now before the
Court, expressly determined that the
conduct at issue did
not violate such
law, and the President himself acted
based upon that determination pursuant to his constitutional authority as

President has sole
discretion when it
comes to the nation’s war-fighting
powers. Moreover,
because the executive branch determined that the use
of Agent Orange did
not violate international law, and because the President
acted on this determination, the production and use of
the chemical are
solely matters of
Executive Branch
concern, and not
subject to judicial
review.
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Justiciable. The
court refuses, in the
absence of executive
actions (such as
reparations) that
might otherwise address the matter, to
accept that this
matter is nonjusticiable. The court also declines to accept
Executive’s determination that international law does not
apply, noting that
“[t]he judiciary is
the branch of government to which
claims based on international law has
been committed.”178
The court then confirms that even
though the President authorizes
something under
his constitutional
powers, such authorized acts are
not automatically
protected by the political question doctrine:
“That the case may
call for an assessment of the President’s actions during wartime is no
reason for a court to
abstain. Presidential powers are limited even in wartime.
...
Authorization by
the head of government does not provide carte blanche
for a private defendant to harm individuals in violation
of international

178
In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 69
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
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law.”180

Commander in
Chief, the President’s actions displace any contrary
international legal
norm as a rule of
decision in this
case.”179
Presbyterian
Church of Sudan
v. Talisman Energy
(S.D.N.Y. 2005)
Sudanese citizens
bring suit against
Talisman Energy
for colluding with
the Sudanese government to commit
genocidal acts and
commit extrajudicial killings, forced
displacement, attacks on civilians,
kidnapping, rape,
and enslavements,
in relation to the
company’s oil exploration activities.181

179

Feb 11, 2005
The State Department uses its letter/
statement of interest to (a) lend it
support to the Canadian government’s argument
that the lawsuit improperly claims jurisdiction over Talisman, a Canadian
company, and
(b)reiterate its amicus argument in
Sosa that the ATS
was not “intended
to open U.S. courts
to suits between
aliens arising from
conduct taking
place entirely in
other countries.”
With regard to
point a, the State
Department noted
that,
“[W]hen [a foreign
government] protests that the U.S.
proceeding interferes with the conduct of its foreign
policy in pursuit of
goals that the United States shares,
we believe that considerations of international comity and

International comity, and the preservation of relations
between the U.S.
and the government
of Canada.

Justiciable (so
found in ruling on a
motion for judgment
on the pleadings).
The court in this
case determined
that, in the absence
of a direct caution
from the State Department that U.S.
foreign policy might
be affected, the seriousness of the
claims outweighed
the executive
branch’s desire:
“The United States
and the international community retain
a compelling interest in the application of the international law proscribing atrocities such
as genocide and
crimes against humanity. To the extent that the Canada Letter and Talisman’s arguments
request this Court
in its discretion to
decline to exercise
its jurisdiction over
past events in order
to avoid conflict
with future Canadian foreign policy,
the seriousness of

Statement of Interest of the United States, In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, States, Jan. 12, 2005 at 1–3.
180
Id. at 64
181
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289,
296 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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judicial abstention
may properly come
into play.”182

Doe v. Exxon Mobil
(D.C. Cir 2007)
Claims brought by
Indonesian villagers
against Exxon Mobil, charging the oil
giant with complicity in rape, torture,
and murder of local
Indonesians.184
State department
asked by district
court to assess foreign policy implications of the adjudication.

182

July 29, 2002.
“With respect to the
litigation, it is the
Department’s considered opinion that
adjudication at this
time could adversely affect [U.S.] interest . . . , recognizing that such effects cannot be determined with certainty. . . . Much of
this assessment is
necessarily predictive and contingent
on how the case
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the alleged past
events counsel in
favor of exercising
jurisdiction.
...
In sum, while a
court may decline to
hear a lawsuit that
may interfere with
a State’s foreign
policy, particularly
when that foreign
policy is designed to
promote peace and
reduce suffering,
dismissal is only
warranted . . .
where the nexus between the lawsuit
and that foreign
policy is sufficiently
apparent and the
importance of the
relevant foreign policy outweighs the
public’s interest in
vindicating the values advanced by the
183
lawsuit.”
Interference with
bilateral cooperation in the fight
against international terrorism; chilling effect on Indonesia’s receptiveness to foreign direct investment
(particularly in the
natural resources
sector, in which
U.S. companies are
heavily involved).

Justiciable. Court
Refuses to dismiss
on political questions grounds (affirmed by the DC
Court of Appeals,
cert denied by the
Supreme Court):
“[The State Department] noted that
the effects of this
suit on U.S. foreign
policy interests
“cannot be determined with certainty.” Moreover, the
letter stated that its

Letter from William H. Taft, U.S. Department of State, to Daniel Meron, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Feb. 11,
2005 [hereinafter Talisman Statement of Interest].
183
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 2005 WL 2082846 at
*7 (S.D.N.Y.).
184
Cary O’Reilly, Exxon Mobil Must Face Lawsuit by Indonesian Villagers,
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 27, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid
=20601103&sid=ARYhia8wUENs (last visited Sept. 30, 2009).
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may unfold in the
course of litigation.”185

Sarei v. Rio Tinto
(9th Cir. 2007)
Claim brought by
citizens of Bougainville, Papua New
Guinea, against international mining
conglomerate. Defendant is alleged to
have committed a
number of human
rights violations in
concert with the
PNG government
and participate in a
blockade which denied the plaintiffs
access to medicine
and supplies, in addition having
caused serious environmental destruction of the locals’
towns and lands.

185
186

October 31, 2001
“The success of the
Bougainville peace
process represents
an important United States foreign
policy objective as
part of our effort at
promoting regional
peace and security.
In our judgment,
continued adjudication of the claims
. . . would risk a potentially serious adverse impact on the
peace process, and
hence on the conduct of our foreign
relations.
...
Clearly the PNG
perceives the potential impact of this

assessment of the
litigation was “necessarily predictive
and contingent on
how the case might
unfold in the course
of litigation.” Most
importantly, the
State Department
emphasized that
whether this case
would adversely affect U.S. foreign
policy depends upon
“the nature, extent,
and intrusiveness of
discovery.” We interpret the State
Department’s letter
not as an unqualified opinion that
this suit must be
dismissed, but rather as a word of caution to the district
court alerting it to
[Executive branch]
concerns.”186
Interference with
the internal affairs
of a U.S. ally (by
threatening the
Bougainville peace
process).

Justiciable.
Though the district
court initially found
the case nonjusticiable, the court of appeals explained
that, based solely
on the facts initially
available to the
court, the case
seems entirely justiciable, and not rendered nonjusticiable
by the political
question doctrine:
“We first observe
that without the
SOI, there would be
little reason to dismiss this case on
political question
grounds, and therefore that the SOI
must carry the pri-

Exxon Statement of Interest, supra note 1, at 2.
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 473 F.3d 345, 354 (D.D.C. 2007) (emphasis added).
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State department
asked by the court
to comment on how
adjudication would
affect U.S. Foreign
Policy.

187
188

litigation on U.S.PNG relations and
wider regional interests, to be very
grave. We cannot
lightly dismiss such
expressions of concern from a friendly
foreign state.”187
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mary burden of establishing a political question. . . .
[T]hese claims can
be distinguished
from cases in which
the claims by their
very nature present
political questions
requiring dismissal.”188
Moreover, even in
light of the SOI, the
court indicated that
mere “embarrassment” to the USG
(and it effect on interstate relations) is
not a sufficient reason to rule this a
political question:
“The State Department explicitly did
not request that we
dismiss this suit on
political question
grounds, and we are
confident that proceeding does not express any disrespect
for the executive,
even if it would prefer that the suit disappear. Nor do we
see any “unusual
need for unquestioning adherence”
to the SOI’s nonspecific invocations of
risks to the peace
process. And finally,
given the guarded
nature of the SOI,
we see no “embarrassment” that
would follow from
fulfilling our independent duty to determine whether
the case should proceed. We are mindful of Sosa’s instruction to give “serious
weight” to the views

Sarei Statement of Interest, supra note 3, at 2.
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007).
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of the executive, but
we cannot uphold
the dismissal of this
lawsuit solely on
the basis of the
SOI.”189
Matar v. Dichter
(S.D.N.Y. 2007)
Claims brought by
Palestinian citizens
against the head of
Israel’s General Security Services,
stemming from an
incident in which
Israeli forces
dropped a one-ton
bomb on a Gaza
building, killing fifteen civilians and
wounding scores of
others.

189
190

November 17, 2006
This Statement of
Interest takes the
form of a longer, legal brief, as opposed
to the shorter
targeted letter common in most of the
other discussed
cases. However, it
does mention (and
the court picks up
on) the State Department’s potential
foreign policy concerns:
“Given the global
leadership responsibilities of the United States, its officials are at special
risk of being made
the targets of politically driven lawsuits abroad – including damages
suits arising from
alleged war
crimes. . . . It is
therefore of critical
importance that
American courts
recognize the same
immunity defense
for foreign officials,
as any refusal to do
so could easily lead
foreign jurisdictions
to refuse such protection for American
officials in turn.
...

Id. at 1206–07.
Mater, 500 F. Supp. 2d. at 295.

Potential to impair
general foreign policymaking functions
by potentially submitting U.S. officials to similar litigation in other
countries; Interference with executive’s ability to
manage the IsraeliPalestinian crisis.

Nonjusticiable. In
deciding that the
political question
doctrine applied,
the court was heavily influenced by the
executive’s statement of interest,
distinguishing the
case at hand from
Kadic and Sarei because here there existed a specific “ request for dismissal
from the Department of State and
the government of
the foreign
state.”190
The court continued
by highlighting that
this case “involves
the response to terrorism in a uniquely volatile region.
This Court cannot
ignore the potential
impact of this litigation on the Middle
East’s delicate diplomacy. As noted
by the Government,
the claims asserted
by Plaintiffs
“threaten to enmesh
the courts in policing armed conflicts
across the globe-a
charge that would
exceed judicial competence and intrude
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Moreover, such
suits would subject
the foreign states
and officials involved to the burdens and embarrassments of litigation, leading to
strains in U.S. relations.
...
[S]uch litigation
would [also] undermine the Executive’s ability to
manage the conflict
at issue through
diplomatic
means.”191

Corrie v. Caterpillar
(9th Cir. 2007)
Relatives of an
American activist
and several Palestinian families
bring suit against
Caterpillar for selling its bulldozers to
the Israeli government while knowing
that the bulldozers
would be used to
destroy homes in
contravention of international law.

191

NA. Defendant Caterpillar corporation
asked the district
court to solicit the
views of the Department of State, however the court declined.
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on the Executive’s
control over foreign
affairs.” (Statement
of Interest at 3.) Allowing this case to
proceed “would undermine the Executive’s ability to
manage the conflict
at issue through
diplomatic means,
or to avoid becoming entangled in it
at all.” (Statement
of Interest at 45.)
Consideration of the
case against this
unique backdrop
would impede the
Executive’s diplomatic efforts and,
particularly in light
of the Statement of
Interest, would
cause the sort of intragovernmental
dissonance and embarrassment that
gives rise to a political question.”192
NA. The executive
branch declined to
offer its views on
the matter.

Nonjusticiable.
The court found
that because the
bulldozers were essentially part of a
grant to Israel given by the U.S. government (and thus
a direct foreign policy decision), their
involvement in the
incident and deaths
was a direct consequence of U.S. foreign policy:
“The executive
branch has made a
policy determination that Israel
should purchase
Caterpillar bulldozers. It advances
that determination

Statement of Interest of the United States, Mater v. Dichter, Oct. 7, 2003, at
22, 45.
192
Mater, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 295.
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by financing those
purchases under a
program authorized
by Congress. A
court could not find
in favor of the
plaintiffs without
implicitly questioning, and even condemning, United
States foreign policy
toward Israel.
...
It is not the role of
the courts to indirectly indict Israel
for violating international law with
military equipment
the United States
government provided and continues to
provide. ‘Any such
policy condemning
the [Israeli government] must first
emanate from the
political branches.’”193
In re South African Apartheid
Litigation
(S.D.N.Y. 2009)
The combination of
a number of independent claims
against corporations
charged with doing
business and aiding/
abetting in South
African government
apartheid policies
that violated customary international law.

193

October 27, 2003
Bilateral relations
Justiciable. The
“Support for the
with South Africa in court found that enSouth African govgeneral, as well as
gaging in business
ernment’s efforts in bilateral and multi- merely because the
this area is a corlateral relations
executive branch
nerstone of U.S. pol- with other developpermitted such acicy towards that
ing countries; Chiltivities does not
country. For that
ling effect on Amer- constitute a political
reason, . . . adjudiican foreign investquestion. Moreover,
cation of the cases
ment; Interference
the court rebuked
will interfere with
with actions already the executive
its policy goals, esundertaken by forbranch what it saw
pecially in the areas eign country, and
as faulty legal reaof reparations and
potential to undersoning in its stateforeign investment,
mine those actions.
ment of interest.
and we can reason“[I]t is a non-seably anticipate that
quitur to argue that
adjudication of
a suit alleging that
these cases will be
a defendant wrongan irritant in U.S.fully engaged in
South African relacommerce would imtions. To the extent
plicate the political
that adjudication
question doctrine.
impedes South AfriBecause the United
ca’s ongoing efforts
States’ Statement of
at reconciliation
Interest relies on
and equitable ecothe identical, erro-

Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 503 F.3d 974, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2007).
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nomic growth, this
litigation will also
be detrimental to
U.S. foreign policy
interests in promoting sustained economic growth in
South Africa.
...
[T]he prospect of
costly litigation and
potential liability in
U.S. courts for operating in a country
whose government
implements oppressive policies will
discourage the U.S.
(and other foreign)
corporations from
investing in many
areas of the developing world, where
investment is most
needed and can
have the most forceful and positive impact on both economic and political
conditions.
...
To the extent that
the apartheid litigation in U.S. courts
deters such investment, it will compromise a valuable
foreign policy tool
and adversely affect
U.S. economic interests as well as economic development
in poor countries.”194

194
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neous premise, considerably less deference is owed to its
ultimate conclusions. To the extent
the Executive
Branch suggests
that a prohibition
on knowingly providing substantial
assistance to violations of the law of
nations would have
a substantial chilling effect on doing
lawful business in a
pariah state, the
suggestion is speculative at best. Moreover, the assertion
in the Statement of
Interest that this
litigation “will compromise a valuable
foreign policy tool”
is true only “[t]o the
extent that the
apartheid litigation
in U.S. courts deters such investment.” The Statement of Interest
never states that
this litigation will
necessarily deter
such investment,
and there is no reason to believe based
on the pleadings
that these casesviewed in light of
the applicable lawwill have such an
effect.”195

Letter from the Legal Advisor of the Department of State, Oct. 27, 2003 (excerpts available in Khulumani v. Barclay Nat. Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 297–98
(2d Cir. 2007).
195
In re South African Apartheid Litigation, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 284 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
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